Point score systems and football coaching secrecy
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Date
2016
Authors
Haugen, K. K.
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Mark
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Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta strojního inženýrství, Ústav matematiky
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Abstract
In this paper, a game between two football (soccer) teams is analysed. The focus is on how the choice of point score system may a ect Nash equilibria in a given simultaneous game and a corresponding sequential version. The reason for this choice, is (to some extent) experience related to the growing secrecy on pre-game strategic choices among football coaches. It is demonstrated by the relatively simple game theory, that the point score system plays a vital role in how teams (coaches) will \play" such games, given that they are rational and recognize Nash equilibrium as a reasonable game prediction. In fact, some evidence on an increased tendency for more pre-game strategic secrecy is logically established in a move from a 2-1-0 point score system to a 3-1-0 point score system.
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Mathematics for Applications. 2016 vol. 5, č. 1, s. . ISSN 1805-3629
http://ma.fme.vutbr.cz/archiv/5_1/ma_5_1_haugen_2_final.pdf
http://ma.fme.vutbr.cz/archiv/5_1/ma_5_1_haugen_2_final.pdf
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Peer-reviewed
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en
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© Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta strojního inženýrství, Ústav matematiky