The health queuing game

dc.contributor.authorHaugen, Kjetil K.
dc.contributor.authorBremnes, Helge
dc.coverage.issue2cs
dc.coverage.volume1cs
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-05T09:42:52Z
dc.date.available2013-03-20T06:00:07Z
dc.date.issued2012cs
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies agent-to-agent games in competition for a free public resource. The resource is not evidently scarce, scarcity may, however, be the equilibrium outcome. The agents' attributes may di er as well as quality parameters between di erent public resources. The examples are taken from the health sector. Based on simple two-player simultaneous games of complete information, results regarding agent equilibrium quality choices are derived. Most notably, Nash equilibria of the type: very ill patients choose low quality hospitals (denoted adverse patient allocation in the paper) are demonstrated. Furthermore, it is argued that a situation characterized by patients with relatively mild diseases but large patient variability (big di erences between patients regarding the given disease) and a health system with medium competition are prime candidates for Nash equilibria characterized by such Adverse patient allocation e ects.en
dc.formattextcs
dc.format.extent159-170cs
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.citationMathematics for Applications. 2012, 1, č. 2, s. 159-170. ISSN 1805-3629.cs
dc.identifier.doi10.13164/ma.2012.10en
dc.identifier.issn1805-3629
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11012/19549
dc.language.isoencs
dc.publisherVysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta strojního inženýrství, Ústav matematikycs
dc.relation.ispartofMathematics for Applicationsen
dc.relation.urihttp://ma.fme.vutbr.cz/archiv/1_2/haugen_bremnes_final.pdfcs
dc.rights© Vysoké učení technické v Brně, Fakulta strojního inženýrství, Ústav matematikycs
dc.rights.accessopenAccessen
dc.titleThe health queuing gameen
dc.type.driverarticleen
dc.type.statusPeer-revieweden
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen
eprints.affiliatedInstitution.departmentÚstav matematikycs
eprints.affiliatedInstitution.facultyFakulta strojního inženýrstvícs
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